In many practical settings, the user needs to retrieve information messages from a server in a periodic manner, over multiple rounds of communication. The messages are retrieved one at a time and the identity of future requests are not known to the server. In this paper, we focus on the private information retrieval protocols that ensure that the identities of all the messages retrieved from the server are protected. This scenario can occur in practical settings such as periodic content download from text and multimedia repositories. We refer to this problem of minimizing the rate of data download as online private information retrieval problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of the Private Information Retrieval (PIR) schemes [1] is to enable a user to download a message or a set of messages belonging to a database whose copies are stored on a single or multiple remote servers, without revealing the identity of the requested message. In a single server scenario, the entire database needs to be downloaded to meet the privacy condition. However, when the user has some side information about the database [2] - [9] , the information-theoretic privacy can be achieved more efficiently than downloading the whole database.
In the PIR with side information setting, the user has access to a random subset of the messages in the database as side information, which are unknown to the server. This side information could have been obtained from other trusted users or through previous interactions with the server. In this setting, the savings in the download cost depend on whether the user wants to protect only the privacy of the requested message, or the privacy of both the requested message and the messages in the side information.
To the best of our knowledge, all of the prior works on PIR focus on retrieval of a single or multiple messages at one time. However, in many practical settings, the user needs to retrieve multiple messages periodically, over multiple rounds. For example, consider a scenario where the user retrieves books or multimedia files from an on-line repository on a daily basis. We refer to this setting as online PIR to capture the fact that the user does not know the identities of the future items that need to be retrieved from the server. The key requirement in such scenarios is to protect the identity of all the requested messages up to the current round. By leveraging previously downloaded messages, the user can significantly increase the rate of data download for each round. Accordingly, we analyze both the fundamental limits as well as the achievability schemes for the online PIR schemes.
A. Main Contributions
In this paper, we study the problem of single-server online PIR with side information. In this problem, there is a user who wishes to download a sequence of messages X W = {X W1 , X W2 , . . . , X Wt } from a database X of K messages, stored on a single server, where t is the total number of communication rounds. The communication is performed in rounds, such that at round i, the user wishes to retrieve a message X Wi for some W i ∈ [K]. We assume that the user decides on which message W i to request at round i at the beginning of that round and that the identity of the future messages W j , j > i are not known at that time. We also assume that at the beginning of the first round the user has access to M messages which are selected uniformly at random from the database. The identity of these M messages are not known to the server.
We focus on the scenario where at round i, the user wishes to protect the identity of all the requested messages individually up to round i,
That is, after the user makes a request to the server at round i, the server cannot decide which of the K messages is more likely to get requested at that round and at the previous rounds. Focusing on scalar-linear settings, we characterize the perround capacity, i.e., the maximum achievable download rate at each round. We also present a scalar-linear coding scheme that achieves this capacity. The key idea of our scheme is to combine the data downloaded during the current round and the previous rounds, with the original side information messages (unknown to server) so as to construct new side information for the subsequent rounds.
We show that for the setting with K messages stored at the server and a random subset of M messages available to the user at the first round, the per-round capacity of the scalarlinear scheme is C 1 = (M + 1)/K for the first round and C i = (2 i−1 (M + 1))/KM for round i ≥ 2, provided that K/(M + 1) is a power of 2.
B. Related Work
The classical PIR problem with multiple servers each of which stores the full copy of the database, has been extensively studied [10] - [12] . The most relevant to our paper is the line of work that focuses on setting with multiple retrieved messages [7] , [13] , [14] as well as settings in which the user has access to certain files as side information before the information retrieval process begins. The side information settings have been studied in [2] , [3] , [8] for the single server setting and in [4] - [7] , [15] for the multi-server setting.
Kadhe et al. [2] initiated the study of the single-server single-message PIR with side information. References [6] and [7] studied the multi-server scenario where the user wants to protect the privacy of both the requested message(s) and the messages in the side information, for the singlemessage and the multi-message PIR problems, respectively. Another notion of privacy, termed individual privacy, was recently introduced in [9] for the multi-user setting of PIR with side information. Recently, in [3] and [8] , we also studied the settings in which the side information is a linear combination of a subset of messages.
To the best our knowledge, none of the prior works on the private information retrieval focused on the online settings in which the requests are issued one at a time such that the identities of future requests are unknown.
Due to the space limitations, some proofs and technical details are omitted and can be found in [16] .
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND MAIN RESULTS
Throughout, we denote random variable and their realizations by bold-face letters and regular letters, respectively. For a positive integer i, denote [i] {1, . . . , i}. Let F q be a finite field for some prime q, and F q m be an extension field of F q for some integer m ≥ 1. We assume that there is a server storing a set X of K messages, X {X 1 , . . . , X K }, with each message X i being independently and uniformly distributed over F q m , i.e., H(X 1 ) = · · · = H(X K ) = L and H(X 1 , . . . , X K ) = KL, where L m log 2 q. We assume that there is a user that wishes to retrieve a sequence of messages X W = {X W1 , X W2 , . . . , X Wt } from the server so that at round i, the user wishes to retrieve the message X Wi for some W i ∈ [K]. We assume that the identity of the index W i of the message retrieved at round i is not known to the user before round i. We also assume that initially the user knows a random subset X S of X that includes M messages for some S ⊂ [K], |S|= M . We refer to W i as the demand index at round i, X Wi as the demand at round i, S as the side information index set, X S as the side information set and M as the size of the side information set.
Let S and W i be random variables corresponding to S and W i , respectively. Denote the probability mass function (pmf) of S by p S (·), and the conditional pmf of W i given S by p Wi|S (·|·). We assume that S is uniformly distributed
for all S ⊂ [K], |S|= M ; and W i 's are independent and uniformly distributed over [K] \ S, i.e.,
otherwise.
Also, we assume that the server knows the size of S (i.e., M ), the pmf p S (.) and p Wi|S (.|.), but the realizations S and W i are unknown to the server before round i.
At round i in order to retrieve X Wi , the user sends to the server a query Q [Wi,S] , and upon receiving Q [Wi,S] , the server sends to the user an answer
as the sets of all queries and answers up to the round i, respectively.
Note that the query
The queries Q [W1:i,S] from the first round up to round i all together must protect the privacy of every demand index up to round i individually (not jointly) from the server, i.e.,
. This means that some correlations between the demand indices of different rounds (or correlations between the demands and the side information) can be revealed to the server, but every demand index up to round i must be kept private individually at each round. This condition is referred to as the privacy condition.
All the answers from the first round up to round i, A [W1:i,S] along with the side information X S must enable the user to retrieve the demand X Wi . This condition is referred to as the recoverability condition, as follows:
The problem of the single-server Online Private Information Retrieval (OPIR) is to design a protocol that at round i ≥ 1, constructs a query Q [Wi,S] for any given S and W i , and the corresponding answer A [Wi,S] that satisfy the privacy and recoverability conditions.
The per-round rate of an OPIR algorithm at round i denoted by R i , is defined as the ratio of the entropy of a message, i.e., L, to the maximum entropy of the answer at round i, i.e.,
where the minimum is taken over all possible realizations W 1 , . . . , W i and S.
The per-round capacity of OPIR at round i denoted by C i , is defined as the supremum of rates over all OPIR algorithms that achieve the capacity up to round i − 1.
In this work, we focus on scalar-linear (per-round) capacity, which corresponds to the maximum (per-round) rate that can be achieved by scalar-linear schemes.
In scalar-linear schemes, the answer
as the encoding vector of y i,j . The i-th unit encoding vector that corresponds to the original packet X i is denoted by
Consider the set of K linearly independent unit vectors {u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u K } as a basis of a vector space V of dimension K. Then, the encoding vector of y i,j , i.e., γ i,j , is a vector in V. We also define the answer matrix at round i, A i , of dimension (m i × K) with γ i,j being the j-th row of A i . Note that the entropy H(A [Wi,S] ) of the answer is proportional to number of messages in A [Wi,S] , or equivalently, the number of rows of matrix A i .
The goal of this paper is to establish the scalar-linear per-round capacity of OPIR, and present an algorithm that achieves this capacity. Theorem 1 characterizes the capacity of scalar-linear OPIR problem for the case when K/(M +1) is a power of 2. It should be noted that the tightness of the scalar-linear capacity for general (vector-linear and nonlinear) schemes remains an open problem.
Theorem 1. For the OPIR problem with K messages, and side information size M , when K/(M + 1) is a power of 2, the scalar-linear per-round capacity at round i is given by:
The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in [16] .
III. ACHIEVABILITY SCHEME
In this section, we propose an OPIR protocol, referred to as the Online Partitioning (OP) Protocol, for arbitrary K and M where K/(M + 1) is a power of 2. The proposed scheme achieves the rate (M + 1)/K in the first round and the rate (2 i−1 (M + 1))/KM at rounds i ≥ 2.
Each round of the OP protocol consists of four steps described as follows.
Round i = 1:
Step 1: The user creates a partition of the K messages into n 1 K/(M + 1) sets as follows. First, it selects an index µ 1 ∈ [n 1 ], by randomly picking an element in [n 1 ] with uniform probability. Then, the user forms the partition, P 1 µ1 by combining the demand index and the side information index set S: P 1 µ1 {W 1 } ∪ S. The user randomly partitions the set of remaining indices [K] \ P 1 µ1 into n 1 − 1 sets, each of size M + 1, denoted as P 1 1 , . . . , P 1 µ1−1 , P 1 µ1+1 , . . . , P 1 n1 .
Step 2: The user sends to the server the partition {P 1 1 , . . . , P 1 n1 }. Note that the server does not know the value of µ 1 , hence it cannot identify which partition includes W 1 .
Step 3: The server generates the answer A [W1,S] = {A P 1 1 , . . . , A P 1 n 1 } as a set of n 1 sums A P 1 1 , . . . , A P 1 n 1
, where A P 1 j = k∈P 1 j X k for j = 1, . . . , n 1 .
Step 4: Upon receiving the answer from the server, the user decodes X W1 by subtracting the sum of its side information set X S from A P 1 µ 1 .
Round i ≥ 2:
If the user is able to decode X Wi , based on the information obtained from the previous rounds, it will not send any request to the server, and proceed to the next round. Otherwise, the user executes the steps below.
Step 1:
, . . . , P i−1 ni−1 } be the query sent at round i − 1. Let λ be the index of the partition set of Q [Wi−1,S] that includes W i , i.e., W i ∈ P i−1 λ . Since the user is not able to decode X Wi before round i, it holds that W i and S belong to the two different partition sets at round i − 1, i.e., λ = µ i−1 . The user then creates a partition of K indices into n i = n i−1 /2 sets {P i 1 , P i 2 , . . . , P i ni } as follows. First, it selects an index µ i ∈ [n i ], by randomly picking an element in [n i ] with uniform probability. Then, the user forms the partition set P i µi by combining P where
Step 2: The user sends to the server the partition {P i 1 , P i 2 , . . . , P i ni }.
Step 3: The server computes n i · M linearly independent combinations of the messages in X . Specifically, for each P i j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n i the server constructs M linear combinations of two messages as follows. First, recall that each partition set P i j is a union of two partition sets from the previous round. We denote these partition subsets as P i−1 j1 and P i−1 j2 , i.e., P i−1 j1
is a union of 2 i−2 partition sets in {P 1 1 , P 1 2 , . . . , P 1 n1 }. The server randomly selects one of such partition sets say P 1 i1 . Similarly, P i−1 j2 is a union of 2 i−2 partition sets in {P 1 1 , P 1 2 , . . . , P 1 n1 }. The server randomly selects one of such partition sets say P 1 i2 . Finally, the server arbitrarily selects M indices from P 1 i1 and M indices from P 1 i2 and constructs M sums (A P i j ) 1 , . . . , (A P i j ) M , such that each sum (A P i j ) l for l ∈ [M ] includes one message whose index is selected from P 1 i1 and one message whose index is selected from P 1 i2 and each message is only included in one of the sums. The resulting M · n i linear combinations constitute an answer A [Wi,S] .
Step 4:
Upon receiving the answer A [Wi,S] from the server, the user retrieves X Wi by using linear combinations corresponding to the partition P i µi and the answers of the previous rounds A [W1:i−1] . Lemma 1. The OP protocol satisfies the recoverability and individual privacy conditions, while achieving the rate (M + 1)/K at first round, and the rate (2 i−1 (M +1))/KM at round i ≥ 2, when K/(M + 1) is a power of 2.
Proof. The OP protocol for the first round is based the Partition and Code PIR Scheme which satisfies the recoverability and the privacy conditions and achieves the rate (M + 1)/K [2] . At round i ≥ 2, the answer A [Wi,S] consists of n i M = KM /(2 i−1 (M + 1)) linear combinations of the messages in X , i.e.,
) M } are linearly independent combinations of the messages in X . (This is because each sum constructed in any round i ≥ 2 includes two (distinct) messages, one from a partition set P 1 i1 and one from another partition set P 1 i2 , such that there do not exist any other linear combinations including both of these two messages). Since the messages in X are uniformly and independently distributed over F q m , then {(A It should be obvious that the recoverability condition is satisfied in the first round. It is also easy to verify that at the beginning of any round i ≥ 2 (excluding the rounds for which the demand has been recovered previously), all 2 i−2 (M + 1) messages whose indices belong to P i−1 µi−1 for some (unique) µ i−1 ∈ [n i−1 ] are recovered in the previous round(s). (For instance, at the beginning of the second round, all M + 1 messages of the partition set P 1 µ1 are recovered in the first round.) Suppose that the user demands the message X Wi in the round i ≥ 2 where X Wi has not been already recovered in the previous round(s). That is, W i belongs to P i−1 j for some j ∈ [n i−1 ] \ {µ i−1 }. By the step 3 of the OP protocol, the answer of round i includes M sums of distinct pairs of messages, where for some fixed j , j , for all of these pairs of messages, the index of one message belongs to the partition set P 1 j ⊂ P i−1 µi−1 and the index of the other message belongs to the partition set P 1 j ⊂ P i−1 j . Using these M (linearly independent) sums, and by the fact that all messages with indices belonging to P i−1 µi−1 (including P 1 j ) have been recovered previously, it follows that all M + 1 messages with indices in the partition set P 1 j can be recovered. Given these new M + 1 recovered messages, from the construction of P i−1 j , it readily follows that all other messages with indices belonging to P i−1 j \ P 1 j can be recovered. That is, all messages whose indices belong to P i−1 j can be recovered in round i. This confirms that all messages, including the message X Wi , with indices in P i µi = P i−1 µi−1 ∪ P i−1 j are recovered by the end of the round i.
To prove that the OP protocol satisfies the privacy condition at round i ≥ 2, we need to show that P(W j = W |Q [W1:i,S] = Q [W1:i,S] , X = X ) = 1/K for all W ∈ [K] and all j ∈ [i]. Since the OP protocol does not depend on the contents of the messages in X , it is sufficient to prove that P(W j = W |Q [W1:i,S] = Q [W1:i,S] ) = 1/K for all W ∈ [K] and all j ∈ [i]. Here we only give the proof for the case of j = i; and the proof for the cases of 1 ≤ j ≤ i−1, not presented here to avoid repetition, is based on a similar technique. For the case of j = i, we have:
where the sum is over all possible S of size M , each of which is a potential side information index set for the demand index W . First, we compute P(W i = W |Q [W1:i,S] = Q [W1:i,S] , S = S ). Without loss of generality, assume W belongs to the kth partition set of round i, i.e. P i k . As mentioned earlier, at round i ≥ 2, each partition set is a union of two partition sets of round i − 1. Without loss of generality, assume that: (i) the kth partition set of round i (of size 2 i−1 (M + 1)) is the union of wth and vth partition sets of round i − 1 (each of size
, and (ii) W is located in the P i−1 w . Any potential side information index set S for W must be a subset of P is equally likely to be the user's demand index. That is, P(S = S |Q [W1:i,S] = Q [W1:i,S] , S ∈ P 1 ) = 1 M +1 for = , and it is zero for any ∈ [ K M +1 ] \ { }. Thus, we have:
Putting the above arguments together, we get
This completes the proof for the case of j = i.
IV. EXAMPLE OF A PROTOCOL EXECUTION
Assume that the server has K = 12 messages {X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X 12 }, and the user has M = 2 messages, X 2 and X 3 , as side information, i.e., S = {2, 3}.
First round: Suppose that the user requires the message X 1 , i.e., W 1 = 1 at the first round. The user creates four sets of size 3 P 1 1 , . . . , P 1 4 as follows. First, the user randomly picks one of the partitions, say P 1 1 . The user constructs P 1 1 = {W 1 , S} = {1, 2, 3} and randomly partitions the set of remaining indices into sets P 1 2 , P 1 3 , P 1 4 . Assume the user has chosen P 1 2 = {4, 5, 6}, P 1 3 = {7, 8, 9}, P 1 4 = {10, 11, 12}. Then, the user sends to the server the partition {P 1 1 , . . . , P 1 4 }. The server sends back to the user four coded packets:
It is clear that the user retrieves X 1 by replacing the values of X 2 and X 3 in Y 1 .
Second round: The user demands the message X 4 , i.e., W 2 = 4. The user creates a partition of the indices [12] into 2 sets P 2 1 , P 2 2 , each of size 6 as follows. The user randomly picks one of these two partitions, say P 2 1 , and forming P 2 1 = P 1 1 ∪ P 1 2 = {1, . . . , 6} (Since W 2 = 4 ∈ P 1 2 and S ∈ P 1 1 ). Thus, P 2 2 = P 1 3 ∪ P 1 4 = {7, . . . , 12}. The user sends to the server the partition {P 2 1 , P 2 2 }. The server computes 4 linearly independent combinations of the messages as follows. Since P 2 1 = P 1 1 ∪ P 1 2 , the server arbitrarily selects two indices from P 1 1 , say {1, 2} and two indices from P 1 2 , say {5, 6}. Then, the server constructs 2 linear combinations of two messages such that in each linear combination one message index is selected from {1, 2} and the other message index is picked from {5, 6}. Also, Since P 2 2 = P 1 3 ∪P 1 4 , the server arbitrarily selects two indices from P 1 3 , say {7, 8} and two indices from P 1 4 , say {10, 12}. Then, the server constructs 2 other linear combinations of two messages such that in each linear combination one message index is selected from {7, 8} and the other message index is picked from {10, 12}. The server sends back to the user four coded packets as follows: Z 1 = X 1 + X 5 , Z 2 = X 2 + X 6 , Z 3 = X 7 + X 10 , and Z 4 = X 8 + X 12 . The user has already downloaded X 1 from the first round. Thus, the user can retrieve X 4 from the answers of the first and second rounds.
Third round: The user demands the message X 11 , i.e., W 3 = 11. Since W 3 = 11 ∈ P 2 2 , and S ∈ P 2 1 , the user forms P 3 1 = {P 2 1 ∪ P 2 2 } and sends it to the server. Since P 2 1 = P 1 1 ∪ P 1 2 and P 2 2 = P 1 3 ∪ P 1 4 , the server randomly chooses one of the two partitions {P 1 1 , P 1 2 } and one of the two partitions {P 1 3 , P 1 4 }. Suppose the server has chosen P 1 2 , P 1 3 . Then, the server arbitrarily chooses two indices from P 1 2 , say {4, 6} and two indices from P 1 3 , say {7, 9}. The server constructs 2 linearly independent combinations of two messages such that in each linear combination one message index is picked from {4, 6} and the other message index is selected from {7, 9}. Finally, the server sends back to the user the following two coded packets: T 1 = X 4 + X 7 , T 2 = X 6 + X 9 . The user has already downloaded X 1 from the first round and X 4 , X 5 , and X 6 from the second round. It is easy to verify that the user can retrieve X 11 from the answers of the first, second and third rounds.
